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l . Types or Impositive Speech Acts 
1.1. The speech acts which are impositive speech acts are those whose 
illocutionary point is to get someone to do something, or to impose the 
speaker's will upon the hearer. Verbs which describe such speech acts are: 
admonish, advise, appeal, ask, beg, beseech, bid, caution, 
command, counsel, demand, direct, enjoin, exhort, forbid, 
implore, insist, instruct, interdict,~. nominate, 
order, petition, plead,~. prescribe, proscribe, propose, 
recommend, request, require, solicit, submit, suggest, 
urge, warn. 
For Austin1 impositive acts were a ~art or the rather diverse 
category he called exercitives . Vendler reduced Austin's category of 
exercitives, but it still contains tvo subcategories which do not fall 
into the impositive class. One is the type Vendler calls 'weaker 
exercitives', which includes the verbs permit and allov; although acts 
of permitting and allowing may make it possible for the hearer to do 
something, they are not attempts to get the hearer to do something.3 
The other type Vendler includes in his list of exercitives that are 
not impositive verbs are what he calls 'provokers'; examples of such 
verbs are dare and challenge, These verbs do seem to share the same 
illocutionary point as the impositive verbs mentioned above, but they 
also differ in many ways. For this reason I have labelled them 'semi-
impositives' and will deal with them in more detail later, arter the 
nature or the more straightforward illlPOSitive verbs has been examined. 
In yet another taxonomy of speech acts, a. McCavley (1973) divides 
impositive acts into imperatives and advisories, apparently using a 
criterion similar to the status condition, the imperatives being those 
verbs which may be used to describe an act in which there is unequal 
status and advisories being used when there is equal status between the 
speaker and hearer. In a taxonomy rormulated by Fraser (1972), the 
distinction is between verbs of requ.esting and verbs of suggesting; 
these two categories correspond, for the most part, to McCavley's 
imperatives and advisories, respectively. 
1 . 2. In this section I 'Will attempt to show that impositive speech 
acts are properly divided into two main types ana three secondary 
types according to the condition on status. Also, it is my contention 
that tbere is a further semantic distinction which differentiates acts 
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within one of the main status types. A summary of the proposed taxonomy 
of impositive speech acts follows. 
The specific Status condition involved in impositive acts applies 
to distinguish the relative status of the conversational _participants 
in ' orders' and ' requests' (herea~er grouped together as the 'unequal 
status impositives ' ) . The condition applies to insure that the status 
of the conversational participants is the same in 'suggestions' (the 
~qual status impositives'). Although the Status condition applies to 
impositive acts in three wa:ys (distinguishing, in general, orders from 
suggestions from requests) the type of application is not always discrete; 
for instance, acts of advising require only slightly unequal status. 
There is no impositive act to which the distinction does not apply; all 
impositive acts exhibit some reference to status. The condition applies 
to orders by requiring that the speaker have (or be acting as if he had) 
superior status to the hearer or be in a position of authority (or acting 
so, at least). Verbs of ordering are: connnand, demand, direct, en.Join, 
forbid, instruct, interdict, prescribe, proscribe and require. For 
requests the speaker is in an inferior position or has lower status than 
the hearer (or, is acting as if this were the case). Requests are 
performed and/or described by the following verbs: apneal, ask, beg, 
beseech, bid, implore, petition, plead, rn, reguest, solicit, suplicate. 
Recoinmendations and suggestions are distinguished by the fact that 
reconnnendations require that the speaker have Just slightly higher status 
than the hearer, or at least that he definitely not have lower status 
than the hearer . For suggestions, the status need only be approximately 
equal, and the speaker can even have slightly lower status than the hearer. 
Verbs of recommending are: admonish, advise, caution, counsel, exhort, 
insist, recommend, urge and~- Suggesting verbs are: ~. nominate, 
proPose, submit and, of course, suggest. 
There is another property which distinguishes among equal status 
verbs . There are verbs of suggesting and recoinmending which reflect an 
attempt to cause the hearer to consider a proposition or action, and 
there are verbs of suggesting and recommending which reflect an attempt 
to get the hearer to do an action. The unequal status impositive acts 
are all attempts to get the hearer to do an action. 
l.3. The first two properties used above for distinguishing the various 
types of impositive acts are quite different in nature from the third, 
and they present different kinds of analytic problems. Felicity 
conditions such as the Status condition can be considered to be pragma-
tic, whereas the decomposition of verbs of recommending and suggesting 
into considering as opposed to doing is clearly semantic. The problem 
arises of how to determine what is pragmatic and what is semantic in 
illocutionary acts; and, although linguists have at least some idea of 
how syntax and semantics interact, it is unclear how pragmatics interacts 
with semantics. While a final solution to this major theoretical problem 
is beyond the scope of this study, some remarks on the matter are required. 
The traditional philosophical distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics is that semantics concerns propositions as they occur in 
language while pragmatics concerns language users and contexts in which 
language is used. One problem is whether illocutionary force is seroantic 
or pragmatic, since the function that illocutionary force performs is to 
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link up the speaker (his intentions, desires, etc.) with the proposition 
of the speech a.,:,t. Linguists have generally considered illocutionary 
force to semantic for several reasons . Ross (1970a) considers the 
possibility of illocutionary force being pragmatic rather than semantic 
(a 'pragmatic analysis' of speech acts as opposed to a 'per-formative 
analysis') and rejects it ma.inly on the grounds that no pragmatic 
theory of language exists and therefore the pragmatic analysis does 
not exist. There is, however, a semantic theory into which a performa-
ti"Ve analysis fits. Moreover, there are syntactic facts supporting 
performative verbs in deep syntactic (i.e. semantic) structure. Ross 
does not rule out the development of a pragmatics, but since the time 
of his writing of this article no theory of language use has been 
propounded that would bg capable of incorporating a pragmatic analysis 
of illocutionary force. What has been proposed is that illocutionary 
acts, while not actually pragmatic in nature, are sensil:ive to pragmatics 
in specific ways. I will be adopting a per-formative analysis here, and 
taking the view that illocutionary force is semantic and is represented 
by abstract per-formative predicates, but that the illocutionary force 
can be indirect and that such indirection is the· result of operations 
which may be performed on pragmatic felicity conditions. 
It is easier to see that illocutionary force is semantic in nature 
if one considers speech acts other than impositive acts. As vas noted 
earlier, the illocutionary point of impositive acts is to get someone 
to do something, and, although it was also noted that illocutiona.ry 
points are in general felicity conditions, this is an oversilnplification 
(which will be discussed further in sub-section 1. li) . At least a 
portion of what Searle (1973} labelled Ulocutionary point5 is semantic 
and part of the illocutionary force. The difference between impositive 
acts a.nd other speech acts is that tbe illocutionary force of impositive 
acts includes an intended perlocution, i.e., it is the speaker's 
intention to, in some -Y, affect the hearer's future actions (even if 
only mental actions). However, this does not warrant calling the 
illocutionary force of illlJ?ositive acts pragmatic. 
Certain felicity conditions on illocutionary acts can only be 
said to be pragmatic; extrinsic conditions refer to the language user 
and the context, and they neither refer to propositions nor have any 
direct syntactic consequences. Vielling felicity conditions as semantic 
creates a problem in that their representation in semantic structure, 
as it is generally accepted, is difficult. Calling felicity conditions 
pragmatic simply relocates the problem of representation, one of the 
many problems yet to be solved in pragmatics. 
One relationship between felicity conditions and presuppositions 
is that what is a felicity condition. for the performance of a particular 
speech act is a presupposition in the reporting of that act. This would 
seem to imply that if any felicity conditions are pragmatic, so are 
presupposition$ (or at least those presuppositions that correspond to 
felicity conditions). Recently it has been suggested (Karttunen 1973, 
Stalnaker 1973, Thomason 1973) that at least some presuppositions are 
pragmatic rather than semantic. It is most likely that the type of 
presupposition that raf1ects fe1icity conditions is one of these pragmatic 
presuppositions. 
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l.~ . Given the apparatus of generative grammar, the semantic structure6 
of inrpositive speech acts can be any of sever al possibilities which 
interact in some way with various felicity conditions to produce 
commands, suggestions, recommendations, and requests. I now sketch 
these possibilities in order to show vhich is the best and why. 
Although I vill be concerned here solely with impositive acts, 
the analysis presented here is extendable to other sorts of speech acts. 
Based on the facts about both direct and indirect impositive acts, I 
will try to show which aspects of meaning and illocutionary force must 
be expressed as part of t he semantic structure of the impositive 
utterance and which must be considered as pragmatic conditions on those 
utterances . 
There are basically four possibilities for the semantic structure 
of inrpositi ve acts; beginning with the most extreme and most unlikely 
we have: 
1 . 4 .1. No similarity in semantic structure 
This view is that there is no necessary underlying similarity among 
impositive speech acts either in semantic primes or in the manner in 
whic h such primes relate to one another . The problem vith this view 
is that there are certain similarities among the various types of 
impositive acts which must be accounted for in some way. First, there 
are the properties that derive from the illocutionary point. Since the 
illocutionary point of all impositive acts is to get the hearer to do 
something , the following properties are shared by all impositive acts: 
a) they are intentional; 
b) they involve causation; 
c) they involve a change of state. 
Next there are syntactic properties: 
d) the subject of the proposition is in the second person when 
the act is explicitly performative; 
e) the proposition of an explicitly performative impositive 
act is in the future tense. 
There ar e exceptions to (d) and (e), signi ficant exceptions, in fact; 
however they are limited to suggestions. (These exceptions will be 
dealt with in sub- section 1.4.2.) 
Finally there is a property vhose importance is very difficult to 
determine : 
f) impositive acts can, in general , be performed directly vith 
an explicit performative verb. 
Although there is no obvi ous significance to imposi tive acts having 
many explicit performative verbs, the fact that they do contrasts sharply 
with tbe fact that Searle's representatives5 (e . g . , affirm, describe, 
mention), for instance, have relatively few explicitly performative 
verbs. Since it is doubt:tul that property (f) has any real bearing 
on the nature of impositive acts (and if it does, it is a mystery how), 
this property will not be considered in t rying to arrive at a probably 
semantic structure for impositive acts. 
Properties (a)-(c) could be considered to be either pragmati c or 
semantic; of the three, property (a) is the one most likely to be 
pragmatic; intention certainly refers to the language user . There is, 
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however, no real problem with considering (a) to be pragmatic, since it 
is a property common to all illocutionary acts havi ng locutions (that 
is, all speech acts except exclamations involve the idea of intention 
even though what is intended differs for various kinds ofacts). Inten-
tionality is therefore not particuJ.arl.y useful in characterizing imposi-
tive acts. What is significant is that while (a) can be thought of as 
praginatic, (b) and (c) cannot (as will be shown below). Consequently, 
the notion of illocutionary point, which includes (a), (b) and {c), is 
not as simple as it at first seemed. 
In adopting a preformative analysis, I have already excluded the 
possibility that all these features are pragmatic, However, it remains 
to be seen that properties (b) and {c) are not pragmatic {the syntactic 
properties (d) and (e) are not serious candidates for pragmatic features) . 
Causation and change of state ((b) and (c)) are, I believe, semantic; 
such semantic features have already been proposed and used in semantic 
structures throughout the literature {e .g., Dowty 1972, G. Lee 1971, 
J. Mccawley 1968). In fact, the syntactic property (d) is a consequence 
of either (b) or (c), or both (b) and (c). (Since causation implies 
change of state it is perhaps unnecessary and redundant to refer to them 
as two separate features.) Change of state involves a time prior to the 
change (t1) and a time after the change (t2 ). When a speech act is 
performed it is performed in the present (t1); consequently any change 
which the act is intended to bring about must occur after t1, and any 
time after the present is the future. It is therefore a direct result 
of property (c) that the proposition of an impositive act is in the 
future tense (property (d)). 
Since properties (b) and (c) are semantic and are common to all 
impositive acts, they must be represented as similarities in the semantic 
structure of impositive acts . 
1.4.2. Total similarity in s~tic structure 
This view is that all impositive acts are semantically the same, 
i.e., they share a distinctive set of semantic primes and similar semantic 
structure and their only differences are those arising from different 
felicity conditions. This view is not as blatantly wrong as the first 
one, but it does suffer serious drawbacks. 
Before examining the problems with such an anaJ.ysis, let us look 
at what sort of semantic primes are involved. An abstract performative 
verb, represented as IMPERE, has been posited in the underlying structure 
of both requests and commands by several linguists (among them R. Lakoff 
and Sadock); however, the nature of this performative predi7ate is not always agreed upon, a.nd, in fact, is rarely even specified. I propose 
a related predicate IMP which has the advantage of not being any more 
closely associated with imperative sentences types or commands than with 
any other sentence type or impositive act type . The semantic prime n,lP 
embodies that which is semantic and peculiar to impositive speech acts, 
i.e., the speaker's attempt to cause the bearer to perform an action. 
The predicate IMP has, of course, in addition, the properties that all 
abstract performative verbs have of being a linguistic verb of communica-
tion, being unembeddable and being able to be realized as an explicit 
performative (the last property is generally, but not universally, true 
of perfonna.tive predicates). 
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Returning to the second alternative for the semantic representation 
of imposit ive acts , such a structure can now be represented as: 
(1) ----A--------v 
I 
NP 
I 
NP 
I 
NP 
I 
IMP Sp 
H /11------
V NP NP 
I I I 
DO H S2 
~ 
(wher e Sp stands for speaker and H stands for bearer). This proposal is 
that all i mpositive acts can be represented as (1) and that the only 
differences among them derive from non-semantic sources such as pragmatic 
felicit y conditions. 
If it were the case that there were no syntactic variations 
corresponding to impositive act types, this proposal would be a plausible 
one. There is some negative evidence for this proposal in Fraser's 
(1972) demonstration that there is no correspondence between types of 
impositive acts (or at least different impositive verbs) and types of 
compl ementi zers that occur with those verbs . But there is also more 
direct evidence against this proposal. 
It was mentioned above (in 1 .4.1.) that there are exceptions to 
the t wo syntactic properties (d) that the subject 0£ the proposition be 
in the second person, and (e) that the verb of the proposition be in 
the future tense. First, there are some exceptions to (d) which occur 
frequently but are easily accounted for . 
Thi s set of exceptions to (d) are exemplified in the performa.tive 
utterances (2) and the reports of performative utterances (3): 
(2) a. I demand that he leave. 
b. I insist that he leave . 
c . I request that he leave. 
d . I order that he leave. 
e. I advise that he leave . 
f. I beg that he leave. 
(3) a . I demanded of Hilda that Norman leave, 
b. I insisted to Hilda that Norman leave. 
c. I requested of Hilda that Norman leave. 
d . ?I ordered (of) Hilda that Norman leave . 
e . I advised Hilda that Norman leave. 
f . I begged of Hilda that Norman leave. 
(The dubious grammatical status of (3d) is idiosyncratic and not 
relevant to thi s point . ) Although these all seem to be violations of 
the generaliza tion that impositive acts require the subject of the 
proposition to be the hearer or second person, these sentences submit 
only to a rather special interpretation, namely, that, in the speaker's 
opinion , t he hearer is in some way abl e to control or infl uence the 
behavior of the person referred to in the proposition. This is shown 
105 
by the fact that (4) is a paraphrase of (2) and (5) or (3). 
(4) a. I demand that you {let/have him leave.} 
get him to leave. 
b. I insist that you 
{let/have him leave.} 
get him to leave. 
c. I request that you 
{let/have him leave . } 
get him to leave. 
d. I order you to 
{let/have him leave. 
get him to leave. } 
e. I advise you to 
{let/have him leave. 
get him to leave. l 
f. I beg you to (let/have him leave.} get him to leave. 
(5) a. I demanded of Hilda that she let Norman leave. 
b. I insisted to Hilda that she let Norman leave. 
c. I requested that Hilda have Norman leave. 
d. I ordered Hilda to have l!orman leave. 
e. I advised Hilda to get Norman to leave. 
f. I begged Hilda to get Norman to leave. 
Also, the (3) sentences can be conjoined vi.th sentences explicating 
the manner in which the request, recommendation or order is carried out: 
(6) a. I demanded of Hild.a that Norman leave and she obeyed 
by letting him go. 
b. I insisted to Hilda that Norman leave and she obeyed 
(?) by letting him go. 
c. I requested of Hilda that Morman leave and she 
complied by having him go. 
d. ?I ordered (of) Hilda that Norman leave and she 
obeyed by having him go. 
e. I advised Hilda that Norman leave and she took my 
advice and got him to go. 
f. I begged of Hilda that Norman leave and she complied 
by getting him to go. 
Sentences (4)-(6) indicate that the semantic structure of {2), rather 
than being grossly different from (1), is simply an elaborated version 
of (1) where the structure under s2 is causative, on the order of (7) . 
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(7) 
V NP 
I I 
IMP Sp 
Although these orders, recommendations and requests cannot be said 
to be exceptions to (d), in any but a most superficial sen$e, that is 
not true of suggestions. 
(8) a. I propose that he leave. 
b. I suggest that he leave. 
(9) a. I proposed to Hilda that Norman leave. 
b. I suggested to Hilda that Norman leave . 
The performative utterances (8) and the reports of them (9) do not 
necessarily imply that the hearer has, in the speaker's opinion, 
influence or control over the actions of the subject of the proposition; 
rather, they only imply that the speaker wants the hearer to think about 
the possibility or desirability of the proposition. This is shovn by 
the fact that (10) and (11) are not paraphrases of {8) and (9) (as (4) 
and {5) were of (2) and (3)) . 
(10) a. I propose that you get him to leave . 
b . I suggest that you let him leave. 
(11) a . I proposed to Hilda that she get Norman to leave. 
b. I suggested to Hilda that she let Norman leave. 
The point here is that the proposition of suggestions and some recom-
mendations may have subjects in some person other t han second with no 
speci al interpretation of hearer influence over the subject associated 
with them. 
The exceptions to syntactic generalization (e)--that the verb of 
the impositive act always be in the future t ense--are the same type of 
impositive acts that are exceptions to (d), i.e., suggestions. 
order } DimmediatelY}(12) I advise you to leave tomorrow. 
i nsist *yesterday.
[ request *last year . 
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{propose} {yesterday.}(13) I suggest that you left last year. 
It might be argued here that these Violations of the syntactic 
generalizations (d) and (e) stem from felicity conditions because the 
kind of impositive acts that violates them (i.e., suggestions) is the 
kind to which the Status condition a _pplies equal.ly. However, the Status 
condition applies relatively equally to recommendations too, but they 
do not tend to violate (d) and (e). Moreover, there is no way in 
general to link up felicity conditions with syntactic facts and, in this 
particular case, a connection between the Status condition and the 
second person pronoun or the f 'uture tense is extremely unlikely. 
I think it is fair to conclude that there is some semantic differ-
ence among different types of impositive acts. The question now is: 
bow should such differences be represented. The la.st two propo,sals 
for the semantic structure of ilnpositive acts explore this question. 
1.4.3. Different abstract performative verbs, same embedded proposition. 
This solution does not really come to grips with the problems 
mentioned in 1.4.2. above. It is inadequate in that it simply~ that 
there are two !MPs with different syntactic restrictions;9 it offers no 
explanation as to why that might be so. Perhaps the lack of explanation 
offered by such a proposal results from our general lack of knowledge 
about the nature of abstract performative verbs. In any case, a 
solution along these lines does not provide much enlightenment. 
It was stated earlier that ideally the abstract performative verb 
should embody the illocutionary force of the speech act; having two 
verbs of imposition would lead one to wonder whether the illocutionary 
force of suggesting is different from that of ordering, recommending 
and requesting. This is certainly not an entirely implausible idea, 
however, the problem remains that there is no way, within the currently 
available framework, to explore tbis possibility. Consequently, the 
rejection of this view is based not on any real evidence against it, 
but on its la.ck of fertility. It may eventually turn out tbat this 
view is the right one, but for now we need a proposal which will shed 
more light on the similarities and differences among types of impositive 
acts. 
1.4.4. Same abstract perfonnative verb, different embedded propositions. 
This proposal says that the similarities among orders, recommenda-
tions, suggestions and requests are due to the same abstract performa.tive 
verb and that the differences result from the structure beneath the 
performative predicate. For orders, recommendations, and requests, the 
structure proposed earlier as (1) is adequate. 
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(l) 
Suggestions, however, require some modification of the structure s1 . 
One possibility is to simply substitute a variable for Hin S1, as 
is illustrated in (14) . 
(14) ____-A------
v NP NP NP 
I 1 I I 
IMP Sp H / Si;--__ 
V NP NP 
l I 1 
DO X S2 
6 
This would solve the problem of the unrestricted subject of the 
embedded proposition of suggestions, but it does not deal with the 
fact that the verb of the embedded proposition is not necessarily in 
the future tense for suggestions. Also, this formulation of the 
semantic structure of suggestions leads to a rather peculiar result 
when the rule of Performative DeletionlO is applied to it. Since 
what Performative Deletion does is delete the performative sentence, 
So, when applied to a structure like (14) it would produce a sentence 
which is indistinguishable from a declarative-form assertion and not 
interpretable as a suggestion (e.g., the reduced form of (8a) would 
be He will leave). 
The other sol ution, and the one advocated here, ls a semantic 
structure on the order of (15) with an intermediate proposition whose 
predicate is CONSIDER, a representation of the properties common to 
the lexical items consider, think about, take into account, etc. 
(15) 
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The hearer NP of s1 is deleted under identity, and then Predicate 
Raising (Mccawley 1968} applies, giving the structure illustrated in (16). 
(16) 
Finally, the surface verb suggest (or one of its synonyms) is inserted 
to produce the derived structure (17). 
(17) 
--------A-------v NP NP NP 
I I I I 
suggest l you S2 
The semantic structure (15) explains why suggestions seem to violate 
the syntactic generalizations (d) and (e} which hold for other impositive 
acts. The proposition which turns up in the surface structure was not 
originally embedded under IMP and is therefore not restricted as to 
person of subject and verb tense. The next section explores the 
restrictions the predicate CONSIDER places on its complement sentence 
and the general nature of CONSIDER. 
2. Suggestions . 
2.1. Before going into the details of the predicate CONSIDER and the 
arguments for its existence in the semantic structure of suggestions, 
I would like to examine the verb suggest, or, more precisely, the 
various verbs suggest. The other impositive verbs of suggesting 
(propose, move, submit, etc. ) a.re not ambiguous in the same way as 
suggest is, and, since they share the important semantic features of 
the impositive suggest, they will be assumed to derive from the same 
semantic structure as suggest. 
In each of the categories of impositive verbs there are a. few 
verbs which seem to typify the category by their neutrality and their 
freedom of occurrence. For suggestions these verbs are suggest and 
propose (as opposed to move and nominate, for example). For orders, 
the verbs order and command are typical; advise and recommend are 
typical to recommendations, as are ask and request for requests. The 
other verbs in each of these categories are distinguished by such things 
as the context in which they may occur, the style or manner of speaking, 
and the strength of the impositive act . Since it is my contention 
that each of the two types of impositive acts has a particular semantic 
structure, regardless of which verb appears in the surface structure, 
I will not be concerned with the individual vagaries of each verb. 
2 .1.1. One sort of ambiguity that suggest exhibits involves the 
agentive sense as opposed to the connection-of-ideas sense . This is 
-----
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an ambiguity that resides in many non-impositive verbs as well (mean, 
imply, indicate, yrove, demonstrate, say and tell). 11 The connection-
of- ideas suggest suggest1 ) has the meaning ' to bring to mind through 
association' and is illustrated in the following sentences: 
(18) It suggested a fine Italian hand to me. 
(19) The fragrance suggested trade ~inds and palm trees . 
Suggest1 is, consequently, entirely distinct from the impositive 
suggest, since verbs which can be used as explicit performatives or 
which can be used to describe speech acts {as the impositive suggest 
can) must take agents as their subjects. 
I t has been argued by philosophers (e.g., Ware 1973) that a crucial 
difference between acts and actions is that acts must be performed by 
an agent. Linguistic evidence for such a view, however, is something 
of a problem to produce . Explicitly performative uses of verbs are 
highly restricted: they do not allow manner adverbs nor do they occur 
embedded after persuade--so that such verbs cannot be shown to be pro-
agentivel2 when they are used as explicit performatives . They can be 
used in imperative- form sentences, e .g., 
(20) Order her to stay. 
(21) Advise him to return . 
(22) Request them to come soon. 
but all that shows is that they can take agents when occurring in that 
context; it says nothing about when they occur as 
~
explicit performatives. 
Similarly, it can be shown that in reports of impositiYe acts the Yerbs 
are agentive: 
(23) Miranda {:!:;:~~] r~~~:::: J us to leave . 
(24) Hilda persuaded Miranda ::qur;i;~:e} us to l eave. 
(_~equest 
These facts make it seem likely that the subjects of explicit performa-
tive utterances at least can be agents, but what is really needed is 
evidence that the subject of such Yerbs cannot be non-agents. Such 
evidence is provided by the following anti-agentive context (proposed 
in G. Lee, 1971) : 
(25) NP turns out to 
where turns out t o is interpreted as proves to. In this frame only 
Yerbs which cannot have agent subjects may occur, as (26)- (29) illustrate: 
(26) "lie turns out to assassinate the premier. 
(27) *He turns out to bel ieve the story. 
(28) It turns out to glinuner. 
(29} It/he turns out to be tall . 
lll 
Those impositive verbs which can be used as explicit performatives 
and which do not have a non-agentive reading (as suggest has) cannot 
occur in this environment. 
(30) "It/be turns out to [~!~:e} that we leave . 
request 
This indicates that these verbs can never take non-agents as subjects 
and therefore must take agents as subjects. Although because of its 
non-agentive reading, suggest does not prove to be agentive according 
to this test, I will show that there is an agentive suggest, which is 
similar enough to the other impositive verbs to be supposed to be 
agentive when used as e.n explicit performative . 
2.1. 2 . Another property of explicitly performative verbs is that they 
are verbs of linguistic communication. It is in this way that the 
impositive suggest differs from yet another suggest; this suggest2 is 
agentive but not necessarily a verb of saying and means 'to show 
indirectly or imply': 
(31) Carl suggested he "as guilty by refusing to ansver 
the question. 
(32) Without saying a word, Hermione managed to suggest 
that we go to bed early. 
(33) Zachary cleverly suggested leaving by declining 
another drink, 
(34) Silently, but unmistakably, Jane suggested that I 
had said enough. 
There are speakers for whom (31)- (34) are marginally acceptable at 
best; this may be the res\11.t of a hierarchical relationship of the 
linguistic communication aspect of verbs, wbich will be e~amined below. 
2.l . 3 , The third suggest, meaning ' to bring (a thought, problem, or 
desire) to mind for consideration', is the one which occurs as an 
explicit performative, as in (35)- (37), 
(35) I (hereby) suggest that we try to help. 
(36) I suggest -you eat less . 
(37) I suggest that Cora did it, 
Suggest3 is a more specific verb than suggest2 (having the added 
restriction of being a verb of linguistic col!mlWlication) and, as vas 
pointed out to me by Arnold Zwicky, can be contrasted with suggest2 
in a sentence like (38), 
(38) She suggested2 that Harbird was guilty, without 
[;~:~;} suggesting3 i t., 
A sentence such as (38) vould be contradictory unless tvo distinct 
verbs were involved; the less specific one (suggest2) being asserted 
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and the more specific one (suggest3 ) being denied .
13 I personally do 
not find (38 ) to be cootradictory and there are speakers who agree 
with that Judgment; however, other speakers do consider (38) to be 
contradictory. This judgment is similar to the Judgment of unaccepta-
bility of (31)-(34) in that it results from the same (closely compacted) 
hierarchy. 
This hierarchy conslsts of verbs of communication and is determined 
by the nature of the conununication--whether or not it is linguistic and 
to what degree it is or is not. A rough idea of this hierarchy's 
categories and category members is given in (39). 
(39) Not Not necessarily Necessarily Really 
linguistic linguistic linguistic linguistic 
persuade- imply- suggest2-suggest3-say-mutter-say in a mutter 
The verbs on the non-linguistic end of the continuum occur with the 
adverbial phrase without saying a word, while the really linguistic 
verbs do not. Conversely, the non-linguistic verbs do not occur with 
the adverb loudly, while the linguistic and really linguistic verbs do 
occur with it . 
(40) a . Without saying a word, Joshua persuaded Irving to 
give up. 
b. Without saying a word, Joshua implied/suggested2 
that Irving should give up. 
c . ?Without saying a word, Joshua suggested3 that 
Irving should give up. 
d . ?*Without saying a word, Joshua said that Irving 
should give up. 
e. *Without saying a word, Joshua muttered that Irving 
should give up. 
f.**Without saying a word, Joshua said in a mutter that 
Irving should give up. 
(41) a. *Joshua loudly persuaded Irving to give up. 
b. ?*Joshua loudly implied that Irving should give up. 
c. ?Joshua loudly suggested2 that Irving should give up. 
d. Joshua loudly said that Irving should give up . 
e. Joshua loudly muttered that Irving should give up. 
f. Joshua loudly said in a muLter that Irving should 
give up. 
There a.re many mysteries connected with this hierarchy; for instance, 
why are manner-of-speaking verbs like mutter or say in a mutter so much 
worse with the phrase without saying a word than say or suggest3? By labelling the manner-of-speaking end of the hierarchy 'really linguistic' 
have suggested that these sorts of verbs are somehow more linguistic 
than other necessarily linguistic verbs; I have no idea what it might 
mean for some necessarily linguistic verbs to be more linguistic than 
I 
ll3 
others . In any caseJ ir it turns out that there actually is such a 
hierarchy, it may be that for some speakers the continuum is so 
tightly compressed in the middle that suge;est2 and "tf•t')3 al'e 
indistinguishable; for those speakers, sentences (31 - 3 are 
unacceptable and (38) is an internal contradiction.l " This is really 
just to say ~hat, for those speakers, agentive suggest is neutral 
rather than anbiguous and that the neutrality involves the manner of 
comnrunication. 
2 . 1 . 4. Returning to the verbs suggest, we find that there is one more, 
suggest1, which means 'to propose someone or something as a possibility'. 
Suggest~ can also be used as an explicit performative, and, in ~act, 
seems to differ from suggest3 only in the nature of its direct object, 
which must be concrete as opposed to the abstract object (e.g., thought, 
problem, etc.) that suggest3 takes. But even that difference has a 
superficial appearance since, according to the definition of suggest4. 
it is as a 'possibility ' ~hat the concrete is being viewed. The 
following sentences, 
(~2) I suggest Cora. (ma.y = 31) 
(~3) I suggest mangoes. 
can be reduced versions of the sentences 
(44) I suggest (that it is possible) that Cora did it. 
(45) I suggest (tba.t i~ is possible) 
.fto have mangoes 1.. for dessert.15 
Lthat ~e have mangoesj 
The fact that the sentences in which suggest4 occur have non-ellipticai 
counterparts which look ver~ much like the sentences in which suggest3 
occurs indicates that they are the same verbs, and that the difference 
resides in their complement sentences. This , then, is the impositive 
suggest whose semantic structure will now be examined. 
2.2. It was proposed in section l tha~ the semantic structure of 
suggestions involves a predicate CONSIDER; such a predicate would 
encompass the meaning common to the following lexical items (and 
probably others as vell): 
{46) consider, contemplate~ deliberate on, mull over, 
muse, ponder, reflect on, take into account, 
think a.bout . 
The semantic commonality of these verbs is that they all express 
intentional mental. activity, directed toward a specific matter. 
Syntactically, they are non-stative: 
(47) a . Morley was on} going home . f ;~;~;!:~:8 
ljninking a.bout 
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(47} b. Morley slowly )~~;~!=::~don} going home. 
ljhought about 
These verbs are a l so agentive: 
(48) a. f ;~;~!!~rupon} going to the party, 
{i:hink about 
M'lly carefully {considered }b. 4 {d.eliberately} reflected on 
thought about 
c . Ly:i::r::::: ::~y~o r~~;~!=:rupo:S. 
ltbink about'J 
going to the party. 
From these properties of the verbs in (46} it can be inferred that 
the semantic predi cate CONSIDER is also non-stative and agentive; 
16consequently, CONSIDER is decomposable into some structure involving DO. 
Although the detai ls of such a str ucture are not clear, nor especially 
important here, it is interesting to note that the semanti c structure 
of suggestions i s not as radicall y different from that of other 
impositive acts as it may have appeared when CONSIDER was first 
introduced. That is, the predicate embedded innnediately under Th1P is 
DO for orders, recommendations and requests; for suggestions it is also 
DO, but with the added specification of direct mental activity . 
A more interesting property of the verbs in (46} and of the 
predicate CONSIDER, is that they take as complements sentences whose 
main verbs may be of any tense. If COMSIDER is a part of the semantic 
structure of suggestions, this property would account for the fact that 
the suggested propositions may be in the present or past tense, as wel l 
as the future tense . In other words, the proposed structure (repeated 
here as (49)), 
(49) __-;So:------.__ 
V ~NP NP 
I I I I 
IMP Sp H S1 
v_,,,,,,.,...,""NP----NP 
I I I 
CONSIDER H S2 
would, by virtue of a syntactic property of CONSIDER, explain why 
suggestions like (50} are acceptable, while similar orders, recom-
mendations and requests, as in (51}, are not. 
(50) I {suggest } that ou left {yeste rday.J 
propose Y last year. 
ll5 
beg you to leave 
order yoll tc, le4'tfe 
demand that you leave 
[yesterday.}advise you to leave 
last year~insi:st that you leave 
request you to leave 
There are two other prOJlerties o.f the verb c,onsi,;ier that must be 
carefully excluded from the syntax of the predicate CONSIDER~ The 
f'ir:at one is only a property 01' consider when it is :synonymous with the 
·.rerbs as:swne and suppose; the property is tha.t the complement sentenc ~ 
be su-ppositiona.l in na.ture. Th,e predicate CONSIDER does not take 
suwositiona.1 complements, so that (52), .mich looks like it coul.d 
derive from a structure like {49) (by Equi-NP Deletion of the hearer 
NP of' S1 and Perform.ative Deletion of So)~ is not a. suggestion. 
{52) Consider th.at all triangles are red. 
It is~ rather, the e~uivalent of (53), 'Which must have a suppm,it ions.l 
reading, 
{53) Assume
{Suppose} that all triangles are red. 
In this imperative-1~orm construction the preferred reading o:f consider 
is. s.upposit ional and therefore not equivalent to the suggest ion: 
(54) I suggest that all triangles are red. 
The other property or consider that is not a property of CONSIDER 
is that consider may take a factive complement but CONSIDER may not. 
This is related to the 'fa.ct about suppositional complements; what it 
means for a sentence to be sup~ositiona.l is that the proposition being 
put forth is to be accepted a6 true or~;;;~ fa.~t ftir the sake of an 
argument, It is, therefore~ a. factiv-e. So it seems that the observa-
tion about the diff'erence between consider and CONSIDER in regard to 
suppositional complements is just an instance of the more general 
dif'fe.renc e between them invo,l ving factive complements. (55 )- { 57) show 
that consider (or one of its synonyms) may have complements which can 
only be interpreted t'actively;J.T (58)-(60) show that suggest (or IMP 
CONSIDER} cannot: 
(55) a. 
b. 
Consider the fact that Martha ran for office. 
Think about the .f'act that Sam skipped. the country. 
c. Take into a~count that the corporation donated 
a million dolla.rs. 
(56) a. Consider his refusal to testify. 
b. Think about Eland's gift ta the cormnittee, 
C. Take into account Yvanne 1 s perserve~e.nce. 
(57) a. Consider Martha1 s running for office. 
b. Think about S!lIIl rs skipping the country. 
c. Take into a.ccount the corporation's dona.ting a 
million dollars. 
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(58) a. *I suggest the fact that Martha ran for office. 
b. *I suggest the fact that Sam skippl;?d the country. 
c. *I suggest the fact that the corporation donated 
a million dollars. 
(59) a. *I suggest his refusal to testify. 
b. *I suggest Bland's gift to the committee. 
c. .;;I suggest Yvonne's perseverance. 
(60) a . *I suggest Martha's running for office. 
b. *I suggest Sam's skipping the country. 
c. i,r suggest the corporation's donating a million 
dollars. 
There is a construction very similar to the Poss-ing construction o f 
(57} and (60) which is non- factive and therefore does occur with suggest. 
This non-factive construction differs from the factive one only in not 
having a possessive marker on the first noun of the proposition. 
Exa:mples are: 
Consider(61 ) {Think about } Martha running for office . 
(62} I suggest Martha running for office. 
2.3. It should perhaps be noted here that the imperative sentence 
form, which crops up so often in a discussion of impositive speech acts, 
is a direct result of an underlying structure which has as its abstract 
performative, IMP, since one of the properties of IMP is that the subject 
of its embedded sentence is coreferential with its indirect object (i.e., 
the hearer of the utterance). The result of this property of IMP (which 
is, incidentally, reflected in the statement of the i l locutionary point 
of impositive speech acts) is that Equi-NP Deletion can apply to delete 
the hearer NP of S1, after which Performative Del etion may apply to So, 
producing the typi cal subject-less imperative sentence form. With the 
except ion of requests, whose deferential nature requires that the 
direct act be somehow modified (as vith the addition of tags like 
please or will you), all impositiYe acts can undergo Equi-NP Deletion 
and Performative Deletion and turn up as imperative sentences. There-
fore, if a structure like (49) does underlie suggestions, one would 
expect imperative- form. sentences beginning with consider (at least in 
its non-factive sense) to be suggestion. Sentences like (61) do seem 
to be suggestions.18 Not only are they paraphrases of sentences like 
(62), but they also do not allow tags that orders typically allow (such 
as expl etives like dammit , or adverbs indicating urgency like now!, 
immediately!, and I don't mean next year!}: 
(63} Consider Martha running for office, *dammit! 
{*immediately! }
(64} Think about doing it, *and I don't mean next year! 
Consider imperatives l i ke (61) cannot be requests because requests do 
not occur as unmodified imperatives . It is more difficult to 
distinguish imperative-form suggestions from imperative- form recommen-
dations, but it does seem that a sentence l ike (65) is odd. 
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(65) f?For y9ur own good, } toe. doing it]aving yourLFor {Th:;ma's} sake, consider hair cut. 
Both the strangeness of (65) and the restrictions mentioned above on 
the kinds of tags that may occur wit h either orders or requests are 
results of felicity conditions on various types of impositive acts; 
these conditions will be examined in detail in section 3 . 
2.4 . There is another way that suggestions may be distinguished from 
other impositive acts which could also be taken as evidence for the 
existence of CONSIDER in the semantic structure of suggestions. It 
was demonstrated by Morgan (1973) that there is a syntactic relation 
between utterances and their responses . Suggestions can typically be 
responded to by sentences making reference either to the act of consider-
ing or the sort of thing which can be considered (i.e . , an idea, a 
proposition, etc.) . So the suggestions in (66) below can be responded 
to by the sentences in (70), but the orders in (67) and the requests 
in (68) cannot . Just as t he distinction between suggestions and 
recommendations was difficult to perceive above, so it is now, wi th 
some of the responses in (70) being appropriate to the recommendations 
in (69) and some not. However, the fact that the responses which are 
not appropriate to the recommendations are those with expl icit reference 
to considering, (70d-f) may indicate a real semantic difference between 
suggestions and reconnnendations. In any case, it is clear that 
suggestions and recommendations have more in common with each other 
than suggestions do with either orders or requests; this is a point 
that I will retur~ to shortly . 
{66) Suggestions: 
a . I suggest we all leave now. 
b . I suggest Harry go first . 
(67) Orders: 
a . I order you to clean the latrine. 
b. Pick up your socks, dammit! 
(68) Requests: 
a. Please give me a dime . 
b. I humbly request that you stay. 
(69) Recommendations: 
a. I recommend that we leave now. 
b. I advise you to stay put . 
(70) Re$ponses: 
a. That 's a good idea. 
b . That's a terrible idea. 
c . I' l l keep tha.t i.n mind. 
d. That's worth thinking about . 
e. That ' s worth considering. 
f. I ' ll think about it. 
g . I'll take that into consideration. 
2.5. The problem of determining just -what is a suggestion and what 
is a recommendation involves both semantics (if CONSIDER i s actuall y 
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a semantic predicate of the act o f suggesting) and pragmatic felicity 
conditions . This sub- section will be devoted to exploring both kinds 
of distinctions in an attempt to clarify the suggestion/recommendation 
problem. The reason that these two types of impositive acts are so 
much more confusing t han orders and requests is that the latter two 
are easily distinguished from each other and from suggestions and 
recommendations by the felicity condition involving the relative 
status of the speaker and hearer. This Status condition applies in 
a very similar way to suggestions and reconunendations, so the difference 
between these two kinds of imposi tive acts must be sought elsewhere. 
The simple proposal for distinguishing suggestions and recommenda-
tions is that: a) reconunendations have in their semantic s tructur e IMP 
DO, and a felicity condition that the speaker believe that the action 
being recommended is desirable or good for the hearer or some other 
concerned party, and that: b) suggestions are semantically IMP CONSIDER 
and do not have a 'Good For ' condition. As might be expected, this 
simple proposal is too simple; the impositive verb suggest, for many 
speakers, implies a Good For condition identical to that of recommenda-
tions . In addition, there are occurrences of direct suggestions which 
do not seem to involve CONSIDER, but rather DO, e.g., 
go soak your head. }
(71) I suggest you go jump in the lake . 
bug off.D
It does seem that sa'.l'cs.stic suggestions like, (71), which have a semantic 
DO, are never supposed to be good for the hearer, so suggestions and 
recommendations are still indistinguishable. 
A less clear set of examples of suggestions which have DO rather 
than CONSIDER in their semantic structure are those i ndirect suggestions 
beginning with Let's as illustrated in (72). 
(72) a. Let's go swimming. 
b. Let ' s throw a party. 
c. Let's get to work. 
d . Let ' s clean the fish; we've got to do it sometime . 
e . It's now or never and we've got to get it over 
with , so let's do it. 
There is a problem with Let ' s suggestions; they frequently seem to have 
a Good For condition (as in (72a) and (72b)), but sometimes it is 
unclear whether or not they have such a condition. (72c) is especially 
unclear, while (72d) and (72e), by their explanatory additions, 
indicate that the end result or the accomplishment of the action is a 
good or desirable thing. If Let's suggestions do have a Good For 
condition, then they are not really suggestions at all, but reconunen-
dations . Another possibility for these sentences is that they do not 
have exactly a Good For condition, but a more general condition that 
the proposed action is not bad f or the hearer or hearers.19 That would 
account for the neutrality of (72c) in regard to desirability and the 
apparent need for justification in (72d- e). It would also explain why 
(71) is either rude or facetious, but not an ordinary suggestions. If 
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this is the case, then there is stlll a pragmatic difference between 
suggestions and recommendations. 
The final problem is that the verbs advise and reconunend (though 
none of the other verbs of recommending) are some~imes used with the 
same freedom of complements as verbs of suggesting. That is, (73} 
and (74) are not W1acceptable. 
(73) I recommend that John, Ella and Ann go . 
(74) I advise that he leave now. 
If the semantic structure of recommendations is lMP DO, there is a 
problem in deriving t hese forms; if it is IMP CONSIDER there is no 
problem. Also, (75) and (76) are at least rough paraphrases of (73) 
and (7h). 
(75) For your sake, consider that John , Ella and Ann go. 
(76) In your own best interest, I suggest that he leave now. 
This indicates that, while these sorts of recommendations can have 
the Good For condition, they also have the semantic structure usually 
associated with suggestions. 
The result of this attempt at disentanglement is four kinds of 
equal status iropositive acts: 
I. DO recommendations. 
Semantic structure: IMP DO 
Felicity condition: Action is good for hearer. 
Example: J recommend you leave now. 
II. CONSIDER recommendations. 
Semantic structure: IMP CONSIDER 
Felicity condition: Action is good for hearer. 
Example: I recommend that Ann go. 
III. CONSIDER suggesttons . 
Semantic structure: n'1P CONSIDER 
Felicity condition: Action is not bad for hearer. 
Example: I suggest that be did it. 
IV. DO suggestions . 
Semantic structure: IMP DO 
Felicity condition: Action is not bad for hearer. 
Example: Let 's get to work. 
2.6. In concluding this section, I would like to point out that, 
although there are no strong arg,,nnents for the existence of CONSIDER 
in the semantic structure of CONSIDER suggestions or CONSIDER recom-
mendations, such a predicate would account for the fact that these two 
kinds of impositive acts can be paraphrased by imperative-form sentences 
with consider and, more importantly, the fact that they can have 
complement sentences which are not constrained by IMP to have second 
person subjects and future tenses , as are other structures dominated by 
IMP. The second point is more important than the first because consider 
i.Jllperatives could Just as easily be explained on the grounds that 
there is a felicity condition which says the hearer is to consider 
the proposition and this condition may be asserted to perform indirectly 
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the act of which it is a condition. There is, however, no other 
way to account for the second point . 
On the other side of the issue are two arguments against 
decomposing suggest into IMP CONSIDER. One is that the scope of an 
adverb like again or almost can be either the whole structure or just 
the embedded verb; consequently sentenc~s like (77) and (78), with 
2the causative verb boil, are ambiguous: 
(77) John almost boiled the water. 
(78) John boiled the water again. 
Sentence (77) can mean either (79) or (80) . 
(79) John almost caused the water to boil. 
(80) John caused the water to almost boil . 
Likewise , (78) can mean either (81) or (82). 
(81) John again caused the water to boil. 
(82) John caused the water to boil again . 
If suggest decomposed into IMP CONSIDER one would expect (83) and 
(84) to be ambiguous in the same -way as (77) and (78) are. 
(83 ) John almost suggested i t. 
(84) John suggested it again. 
Thes.e sentences are not ambiguous in the expected ,,ay, and so the IMP 
CONSIDER proposal is weakened . 
To f\u'ther weaken it is the fact that the embedded Dredicate of 
a decomposed verb can be referred to by a pronoun , as in-(85).23 
(85) Julia thickened the sauce, but it took her three 
hours to bring it about. 
where the second it refers not to what Julia did , but rather to what 
she caused to happen (i.e., that the sauce became thick). In a report 
of a suggestion, CONSIDER cannot be anaphorically referred to. 
(86) George suggested the theatre, but it took him three 
hours to do it. 
(86) can only be interpreted to mean George bas a terrible stutter, 
aphasia, or is incredibly circumlocutory. It cannot mean that it was 
three hours before anyone considered the theatre. 
Although these two argwnents have only been made for causative 
decompositions, there is no obvious reason they should not hold for 
impositive decompositions as well, especially in view of the fact that 
there is a causal relation between the speaker and the hearer of an 
impositive act. These arguments are therefore good arguments against 
the IMP CONSIDER proposal. For this reason, I leave it as simply a 
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proposal., or CONSIDER suggestion, saying only that it is possible, 
not necessarily desirable . 
3 . Indirect Illocution. 
3.1. According to a proposal. made by Heringer (1972), speech acts 
may be performed indirectly by reference to certain participant-based 
felicity conditions on those speech acts. Heringer's proposal is 
that such intrinsic conditions can be either asserted or questioned 
to perform, indirectly, acts for vhich they are conditions . These 
intrinsic conditions are either essential, involving the speaker's 
knowledge, intentions and desires , or non-essential, involving the 
speaker's beliefs . The essential intrinsic condition of intention is 
an important part of what Searle cal.ls illocutionary point, in that 
the illocutionary point is the speaker's purpose or intention in 
performing the speech act. This condition and the essential conditions 
of speaker's knowledge and desire are not of primary importance to the 
performance of ipdirect impositive acts and therefore will not be 
discussed here. 24 This section will be mainly concerned with those 
intrinsic conditions, which happen to be non- essential, that are 
peculiar to impositive speech acts and that are the basis Cor the 
majority of indirect impositive acts . 25 
3.2. There is, for impositive acts, a condition of participant status 
which is neither purely intrinsic nor purely extrinsic .26 It cannot, 
therefore, be used as a basis for indirect impositive acts (i.e., either 
questioned or asserted to perform the act) , but it does affect how 
various types of indirect impositive acts may be performed. 
The Status condition for irupositive acts can be thought of as 
applying in three distinct ways: for commands the speaker must believe 
he has superior status to (or authority over) the hearer; for 
suggestions and recommendations, the speaker must believe that he and 
the hearer are of equal status; for requests, the speaker must believe, 
or be acting as if he believed, that he has status inferior to the 
hearer . This is a siruplification, however; it takes slightly more 
status to advise than to suggest and even more to insist, urge or 
exhort . Similarly, it takes less status to propose or submit than to 
advise. Rather than viewing the Status condition as dividing impositive 
acts into a trichotoizy, then, it will be considered to be one aspect 
of a 1squish•,27 vith orders and requests having special properties , 
not because they are qualitatively different from suggestions and 
recommendations, but rather because they form the endpoints or 
boundaries of the squish. · 
Regardless of the way in which the relation between tbe Status 
condition and suggesting is viewed, it still contrasts sharply with 
the relation between the Status condition and ordering on the one hand, 
and the Status condition and requesting on the other hand. Commands 
are only felicitous if the conversational participants believe that 
the speaker has the authority or sufficiently higher status in terms 
of the particular social setting relevant to the conversation. When 
a person without such status issues a command it is considered rude or 
irupertinent and will, no doubt, be ignored. Requests, however, are 
used when the speaker wants to act as if be is inferior in status to 
the hearer(s) . Such behavior is usually referred to as 'deference' 
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and is crucially involved in certain conditions on illocutionary acts. 
It should be noted that neither aspect of the Status condition is 
independent of the social setting; in fact, they are completely 
determined by such setting. 
There is a certain asymmetry here due to the nature of authority; 
a person in an authoritative position may easily show deference if he 
l ikes , but it is much more difficult (perhaps impossible) for a person 
not in authority to show authority. The linguistic consequence of this 
is that the violations on authority conditions for commanding are much 
easier to recognize t han violations of deference conditions on requesting. 
In fact i t may never be the case that a speaker cannot show deference. 
In both cases the speaker and hearer(s) have to agree upon their 
relative status. If they do not agree and the speaker makes a conunand, 
a hearer may respond with a denial or questioning of the speaker's 
authority, e.g., 
(87) You can't t ell me what to do. 
(88) Who do you t h i nk you are, elling me what to doJtrying to tell me whatDto do. 
(89) You've (got) no right to order me around. 
A speaker with authority to conunand may, of course, choose to be 
deferent. However if his superior is recognized by the hearer{s) they 
may respond with a direct r eference to the speaker's ability to command: 
(90) I won't do it unless you order me to. 
(91) I'm afraid you'll have to make that an order. 
(92) I'll do it if you command me to, but not 
J otherwise, l· 
Lif you just ask!J 
There is a way in which the Status condition, by applying to 
suggestions in such a neutral way, affects indirect suggestions . If one 
person wishes to order another to do something, he cannot possibly do 
it by asking a question; likewise, in making a request or plea a 
speaker cannot use an assertion without relinquishing bis guise of 
deference or subservi ence . Si nce these restrictions do not hold for 
suggestions, both assertions. and questions may be used to perform the 
indirect illocutionary act of suggesting. 
The squish representing the continuum of the Status condition 
also indicates t he strength of the act , with the strongest acts being 
at the order end and the weakest at the request end. Strength itself 
is not a f elicity condition but rather a result of a combination of 
conditions, one of which i s Status. (The other condition involved will 
be discussed in 3. 5. ) . 
Impositive verbs fit into the strength squish in approxi~.ately 
the following order (slashes indicate equivalence of strength): 
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(93) command/order/enjoin/interdict - proscribe/demand/ 
forbid - direct/require - instruct - exhort/urge/ 
~ - insist/admonish - caution/counsel/advise/ 
recommend - suggest - submit/propose/move/nominate -
ask/reguest - petition/bid - solicit/appeal - plead/ 
beg/beseech/implore - ~sunplicate. 
This is not meant to be definitive by any means; there is always a 
problem with fixing the order of continua, especially when many of the 
items are synonYlllOUS or nearly so. It is presented here only to give 
a general idea of how a squish based on strength might look, and it 
does reflect the way in which these acts are talked about . For 
instance, a strong suggestion is actually a recommendation. Also, 
different impositive acts can be referred to in different ways, e.g. 
and that's an order, versus it was ,just a suggestion and I was only 
asking. 
3 . 3. There are three main intrins1.c conditions upon which indirect 
impositive acts are based and one derivative condition. The first 
condit:!.on is one discussed by Beringer as condition 3 . 31: 'the performer 
of an illocutionary act K believes that no acts involved in the 
performance of Kare already performed . ' This formulation, however, 
needs certain modification; not only must the speaker believe the actions 
are not performed, he must also believe they are not, at the time of 
the speech act, being performed,28 ' 
That this condition is actually a condition on impositive speech 
acts is illustrated by the fact that if it is denied at the same time 
that the act is uttered, an unacceptable sentence results: 
(94) *I don't care if you are doing the dishes, (I order 
you to) do the dishes. 
(95) *I suggest you have your wisdom teeth taken out even 
if you've already had them taken out. 
(96) *Please set the clock if you've already done so. 
That the proposed modifica.tion of Heringer' s statement of the 
condition is necessary is shown by the fact that (97) - (99) are not 
unacceptable: 
(97) I don't care if you did do the dishes (once), (I 
order you to) do the dishes (again). 
(98) I suggest you look (some more/again), even if you've 
already looked. 
(99) I know you just did it, but please do it again for me . 
This condition will be referred to as the Not Done condition. 
3.4 . The next intrinsic condit ion is restricted to recommendations 
and suggestions, and requires that the action involved be possible. 
It is rather difficult to tell where this Possibility condition stops 
being applicable on the impositive continuum, but it does seem that 
whereas one can order and request actions, he does not necessarily 
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believe to be possible, he cannot suggest or recol1llllend them:29 
(100) Whether it's possible or not, I order you to be 
there. 
(101) Whether or not it's possible for you to come, I 
re~uest you to (come). 
(102) ??Whether or not it's possible for you to do so, I 
suggest you take Joanna with you. 
(103) ?*I advise you to get a good night's sleep, even 
though it's impossible. 
3,5. The third condition bas to do with whether or not the action, in 
the speaker's opinion, is desirable, or good for, either the hearer or 
some third party . 30 This is a belief condition and should be carefully 
distinguished -from the intrinsic condition involving the speaker's 
desire. This latter condition is an essential one, and it requires 
that t he speaker want the action to be done. The non-essential belief 
condition (which will be called the Good For condition) primarily 
concerns the nature of the act mentioned and usually some person other 
than the speaker. The two conditions are not unrelated, however; it 
can be the case that the reason the speaker wants the hearer to do the 
action is that the speaker believes the action will benefit the hearer 
or someone else whom the hearer has an interest in. Orders do not 
have this condition and requests ordinarily do not, although they may 
be modified to include it, as it: 
(104) a. For Charley's sake, I beg you to leave now. 
b. For your own good, please tell the truth. 
It was assumed in section 2, for the sake of exposition, that 
there was a qualitative difference between suggestions and recommenda-
tions in terms of the Good For condition. Upon closer examination, 
however, it appears that this condition is really only quantitatively 
different for suggestions and recommendations. Consequently, there 
are no absolute differences between these two ty:pes of impositive 
acts. That there is no absolute difference is not surprising in view 
of the overlap in meaning of the verbs suggest, advise, and recommend. 
These verbs are in the middle of the strength squish mentioned above; 
they are the equal status verbs. This portion of the squish will be 
referred to simply as suggestions when there is no reason to specify 
whether the semantic structure contains DO or CONSIDER and no reason 
to specify the particular application of the Good For condition. 
(105) exhort/urge/~ - insist/admonish - caution/ 
counsel/advise/recommend - suggest - submit/ 
propose/move/nominate. 
This strength squish corresponds not only to difference in status, 
but also in how good for the hearer (or whomever) the action is 
believed to be. Al.though the Good For condition cannot in itsel f 
definitively differentiate between various direct impositive acts, 
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it does play an important role in differentiating indirect impositive 
acts, as will be seen in the next section . The Good For condition can 
be used to perform indirect impositive illocutions because it is an 
intrinsic condition; the Status condition is not purely intrinsic and 
therefore cannot be so used. 
The Good For condition applies most strongly to the strong end 
of the sub-squish (105); those acts to which the Good For condition 
applies most strongly can be modified by the condition, but not by its 
denial as (106) and (107) show. 
(106) 
(107) 
a. Since sunshine is healthful, 1 reconnnend t hat 
we all sunbathe two hours a day. 
b. *Since sunshine is dangerous, T reconnnend that 
we all sunbathe two hours a day. 
a. I warn you that if you don't get out of the 
way, you'll get hurt . 
b. *I warn you that if you don't get out of the 
way, you won I t get hurt. 
(106) and (107) are, of course, not out-and-out unacceptable sentences; 
they can be used if the speaker is trying to be ironic or especially 
perverse (i .e., the speaker has, or is acting as if he had, the belief 
that being unhealthy or dead is good and that one should try to attain 
such a state) . It should be noted that on the perverse reading of 
(106) and (107) the Good For condition is still not being violated 
or suspended; what is being violated is the ordinary way of interpreting 
the adjective dangerous and the verb hurt. Whereas in normal usage 
dangerous and hurt are both considered to be bad or undesirable, in 
the perverse usage they are being used by the speaker as good or 
desirable things. So that if dangerous or hurt are believed by the 
speaker to mean or imply something which is bad for the hearer, then 
the (b) sent~nces are unacceptable . I am not able t9 find an acceptable 
reading for::n 
(108) *Since I believe sunshine is dangerous, and I believe 
danger is bad and to be avoided at all costs, I 
reconnnend that we all sunbathe two hours a day. 
Before going into the last intrinsic condition which may be used 
derivatively to perform indirect impositive acts, I would l.ike to point 
out that there is at least one other feature of impositive acts that is 
derived from others. Because there are two conditions determining the 
strength squish, it is very difficult to be precise about which of 
several verbs, like urge, exhort and ~' is stronger--,or even if 
strength is what differentiates t hem. There is , however, a derived 
property of strength , which Searle calls style of disclosure, that can 
be used to distinguish among impositive verbs. 32 Style is said to be 
derivation of strength, because style tends to correspond very closely 
with strength, and it is only when two or mor,e impositive verbs have 
identical strength t hat style distinguishes them. Such is the case 
with exhort, urge and~; although warn has certain distinctive 
syntactic properties, semantically, it is indistinguishable from urge 
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and exhort. All three of these verbs have the same amount of strength, 
but exhort emphasizes the contribution of the Status condition to 
strength, while urge stresses the Good For condition. Warn is more 
like urge in that it also stresses the Good For condition, but it 
tends to do it by giving the reason that a particular action is or 
is not good for the hearer . 
3.6. Finally, indirect illocutions of ilnpositive acts may be performed 
by asserting or questioning certain implications of the three intrinsic 
conditions just discussed, The implications that may be so used are 
those which refer to any of the three conditions as a (or the) reason 
for the hearer to carry out the action specified in the proposition, 
or that give a reason for the speaker believing the particular intrinsic 
condition . This Reason condition is a derived condition because its 
existence is dependent upon the three basic conditions of Not Done, 
Possibility and Good For, which provide the reason for doing the 
proposed action . The Reason condition is, then, that the reason the 
speaker vants the hearer to do the action is any one of, or any combina-
tion of, the three primary intrinsic conditions . The implication of 
the Reason condition itself is that the speaker believes any one of, 
or any combination of the intrinsic conditions . 
The Reason condition can be used to modify impositive acts by 
stating, either conditionally or not, that there is no reason not to 
do the action (as illustrated in (109)), or that there is a reason to 
do the action (as illustrated in (110) and (111)). 
(109) a. If/Since there's no reason not to learn French, 
I suggest you do (it). 
b . *If/Since there is a reason not to learn French, 
I suggest you do (it) . 
(110) a. If/Since there ' s a good reason to go to New 
Zealand, I recommend that we go. 
b. *If/Since there's no good reason to go to New 
Zealand, I recommend that we go. 
(111) a. If/Since there's a good reason not to eat 
apples, I warn you not to. 
b. *If/Since there's no (good) reason not to eat 
apples, I warn you not to. 
For sentences (109a) and (110b) there is the same sort of 
perverse reading as there was for (106b) and (107b) . For the perverse 
reading of (109b) the speaker must believe that things should be done 
without reasons for doing them, which is a strange attitude . For the 
weird reading of (11Gb) the speaker must believe that the fact that 
there is no reason to do the action is itself a reason to do the action, 
which is conceivable if, for some reason, the speaker wants to do 
something irrational (or at least apparently irrational). Perhaps 
it is more likely that such a speaker would want to do something 
unpredictable, as when he does not want another person to be able to 
figure out what he will do next or where he will go next and there-
fore tries to do the thing or go to the place for which no reason, 
except for the very lack of reason, exists. 
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It seems that there ought to be a perverse reading for (lllb) 
parallel to those of (109b) and (llOb), however if there is one, I 
cannot discern it: (lllb) seems simply to make no sense at all, perhaps 
because of the over-abundance of negatives . 
It might be argued that the (a) versions of (109)- (111) are not 
ideal sentences either; and I would agree, however I believe that the 
reason they are not perfectly common everyday sentences is that these 
conditions are so basic to the speech acts in question that it seems 
odd actually to assert them; they are generally assumed by all 
speakers of the language. Certainly in the case of the version of the 
(a) sentences with if, the oddity arises from the fact that the 
sentences are tautologies . In the cases of the (a) sentences with 
since, they seem strange because usually if a speaker believes that 
there is a reason to do something or not to do something, he will give 
the reason rather than just saying that there is one. This is borne 
out by the fact that (109a) with since is not an unusual a sentence as 
(110a) and (llla) with since, and in (109a} the condition being 
illustrated is the lack of a reason . 
The Reason condition can also modify an impositive act by giving 
one of the three basic conditions as a reason, as is illustrated in 
(112)-(114): 
(112) a. If/Since you haven't done your homework yet, 
I suggest you do it . 
b . *If/Since you've already done your homework, 
I suggest you do it. 
(113) a. If/Since it's possible to finish today, I 
suggest we do so. 
b. *If/Since it's impossible to finish today, I 
suggest we do so. 
(114) a. If/Since it's good for you, I recoDUDend you do it . 
b. *If/Since it's not good for you, I recommend you 
do it . 
4. Indirect Impositive Acts . 
4 .1. Impositive acts may be performed directly in two ways: as an 
explicit performative sentence vitb an impositive verb, or as an 
imperative-form sentence. The first way bas been exemplified repeatedly 
in the preceding sections. The second way has been mentioned with regard 
to CONSIDER suggestions; it is the most normal for of impositive acts 
on the strong end of the impositive squish (i.e . , orders). Imperative-
form sentences may also be used to suggest, but not to request, since 
using a direct form is not a polite wa:y to irapose one 's will upon 
another, and the Status conditions on requests is that the speaker 
act as an inferior to the hearer (and hence deferentially). 
There are many more ways to perform impositive acts indirectly, 
but even these are limited by the Status condition. Orders, to be 
effective, must be direct; requests, to be polite, must be in the form 
of questions or otherwise modified (e . g . , with the addition of please 
or tags). Suggestions, however, are not so constrained by the Status 
condition and therefore may be either assertions or questions. The 
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result is that there are many ty-pes of indirect suggestions, some 
ty-pes of indirect requests and no indirect orders. 
4.2. Looking first at the Not Done condition, we find the following 
indirect suggestions based on it, 
(115) Have you thought about Jeremiah's doing it? 
{u6) You haven't considered Jeremiah's doing it. 
(117) Have you read Cat's Cradle? 
(ll8) You haven't read Cat's Cradle. 
Sentences (ll7) and (118) are less obviously suggestions than {115) 
and (116), but they do appear quite natural with the responses 
appropriate to CONSIDER suggestions. There seems to be no reason 
that (ll7) and (118) are not DO suggestions; also, one would expect 
(115) and (117) to be possible indirect requests which they are not . 
It would appear that the Not Done condition has a very narrow range 
of indirect acts that it can produce by being questioned or asserted; 
although it is a condition that applies very generally, it only 
produces CONSIDER suggestion indirectly. Why this should be so is 
not clear, but the Not Done condition is the only condition which 
applies equally to all impositive acts; the other conditions apply 
more strongly to some impositive acts than to others and can be used 
to perform indirectly those to which it applies most strongly. The 
Not Done condition follows this pattern for the performance of indirect 
acts, but it does not apply any more strongly to one type of act than 
to another. 
The Not Done condition also has implications which may also be 
used to perform indirect suggestions: 
(119) Are you aware that Jeremiah could do it? 
(120) You don't seem to be aware of the possibility 
of Jeremiah's doing it. 
Sentences like (119) and (120) are possible indirect suggestions based 
on the Not Done condition bees.use ' not being aware ' is related to 
'not doing' o.r 'not done' by the Reason condition; that is, a. possible 
reason for not having done an action is not being aware of the 
possibility of doing it. The indirect suggestions (119} and (120) al.so 
involve the Possibility condition, illustrating that indirect illocu-
tions may be far from simple results of asserting or questioning 
felicity conditions. 
Notice that (121) is not really a suggestion- passibly not an 
acceptable sentence of any kind: 
(121) ?You aren't aware of the possibility of Jeremiah's 
doing it. 
The oddity of (121) is a result of the fact that it is very difficult 
(if not impossible) to know, or even think with any confidence, what 
another person is aware of (in ordinary circumstances) . It is not 
as difficult to have an opinion on whether or not another person has 
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considered a matter since such consideration usually results in some 
sort of action (linguistic or otherwise}, especially in a situation 
calling for suggestions upon or discussion of, a matter. 
4.3. The Possibility condition produces the following indirect 
suggestions, (122)-(124), and requests, (125)-(126). 
(122) You could eat liver. 
(123) It wouldn' t kill you to wash your feet. 
(124) Maybe she could take you to school. 
(125} Could we move that thing? 
(126} Is it possible to turn the radio down? 
No doubt, for some speakers, the more direct assertion, It's possible 
for you to eat liver, which (122) is a paraphrase of, is also 
acceptable; in my dialect there is something strange about stating 
such an obvious fact in such a direct manner. 
Sentence (123) is slightly more indirect than {122), but since 
it rests on the indisputable fact that, for most people, an action 
which requires relinquishing one's life is not a possible action, it 
is a reasonable indirect suggestion. (124) illustrates that the 
possibility can be asserted more than once, and that such a possibility 
may depend on someone's physical ability to do something. An even more 
exaggerated assertion would be Maybe it might just possibl:r be the case 
that she could possibly, if she were able, take you to school, which 
is still an indirect suggestion although it certainly gives the hearer 
cause to doubt that the speaker actually believes in the possibility of 
the action. Sentences (125) and (126) are straightforward and need no 
further connnent • 
It should be noted at this point that since all the conditions 
being discussed here are conditions on the speaker's beliefs, the 
indirect suggestion performed by asserting those beliefs can be 
prefaced with I believe or I think, so that jUCh versions of (116) 
and (122)-(126) are also suggestions: 
(127 l I think you haven't considered Jeremiah's doing it. 
(128) I don't think you've thought about Jeremiah's 
doing it. 
(129) I believe you could eat liver. 
(130) I don't think it would kill you to wash your feet. 
(131) I believe maybe she could take you to schoo1. 
I have used as main examples, and will continue to do so, those 
sentences without the I believe or I think in them because it is always 
assumed that, if a speaker is being sincere, he believes what he 
asserts, and therefore the simple sentences are more common and more 
natural. 
Although the Possibility condition applies to all impositive 
acts, it is stronger on the weak end of the continuum; that is, the 33Possibility condition is more important for suggestions and requests. 
With the exception of orders, at the strong end of the squish, just the 
opposite is true for the Good For condition. It applies more strongly 
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to reconunendations than to suggestions and more strongly 
to suggestions than to requests . The result of this, for indirect 
illocutions, is that the Possibility condition is used to perform 
indirect requests and suggestions, but not recommendations, and the 
Good For condition is used to perform reconunendations (and sometimes 
suggestions) , but not requests . 
4. 4. The Good For condition is that the speaker believes the action 
is desirable or good for the hearer, although it is not always as an 
individual that the hearer is being thought of, but rather as a member 
of a group . There may be cases where the best interest of a particular 
individual is, in the speaker's opinion, less important than the welfare 
of the group; in such cases a recommendation may still be made, even 
though the proposed action may not be desirable for a particular member 
of the group . (However, even in these cases, the speaker believes the 
bearer will, as a member of the group, benefit in the long run . ) 
Some indirect recommendations, then, are: 
(132) It would be nice if you visited your mother. 
(133} He ought to learn to drive. 
(134) You should read Tolkien . 
(135) Shouldn't you try sketching first? 
(136) It wouldn't hurt to straighten up your desk 
once in a while. 
(137) Wouldn't it be better to chew tobacco? 
Sentences (132)-(135) are fairly straightforward; that which is 'nice' 
is good for someone, and, for (133)-(135), the only link needed is the 
generally accepted notion that people should do good or desirable 
things, or that desirable things are things that people should do. 
Sentence (136) is more complicated, partly because it is a sarcastic 
recommendation, but also because of certain assumptions the speaker 
mall.es when he says (136) . Since the speaker or this sarcastic 
recommendation believes that for the hearer to straighten up his desk 
once in a while is a desirable thing, and furthermore he believes (or 
at least is pretending to believe) that the hearer shares this belief, 
then there must be some reason that the hearer doesn 't straighten up 
his desk; a candidate (deliberately unlikely, by the way, since otherwise 
the speaker would not be able to deny it so confidently) for such a 
reason is that the hearer fears he will do himself psychic or bodily 
harm by cleaning up his desk. The speaker doesn't think any harm will 
befall the hearer if he cl eans up his desk and says so. The sarcasm 
comes from the assumption of some sort of harm as a consequence of 
desk-cleaning; the speaker doesn't really believe that that is the 
reason for hearer's slovenliness, he is Just pretending to believe it 
in order to attribute a reason to the hearer which he (the speaker) 
can then dispute or deny. This complex example involves the Reason 
condition as well as the Good For condition. 
Sentence (137) is considerably less complicated; the speaker is 
questioning the condition with a negative auxiliary, which implies 
that he believes that to chew tobacco vould be better; since the 
related question with a positive auxiliary lacks that implication, 
Would it be better to chev tobacco? does not count as a recommendation; 
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this exemplifies the fact that the condition need not be stated but 
only implied, to effect the recommendation; it is also true of (135) and 
other questions . 
Indirect warnings are also produced by asserting the Good For 
condition; however, warnings are generally against particular actions , 
so they turn up in negative sentences more often than in positive ones. 
(138) It's not a good idea to run on lava rock . 
(139) If I were you I wouldn't do that . 
(140) I don't think you should drink that cobra venom. 
(141) It's not safe to swim here. 
Example (138) is an assertion of the condit ion by virtue of the fact 
that a good idea is a paraphrase (perhaps a loose paraphrase, but a 
paraphrase, nevertheless) of ' something that is good for someone'. I n 
(139) there are certain assumptions made; if an action is undesirable, 
the speaker would not do it--so, instead of saying it is not desirable, 
he says he wouldn't do it, thus affirming the consequent . Furthermore, 
since the hea:rer is the one contemplating, or about to do, the action, 
the speaker hypothetically puts himself in the hearer's position, thereby 
warning him indirectly. 
The cobra venom sentence is more obvious; one should not do 
potentially harmful things . (141) is also straightfow&rd--unsafe 
actions (in the belief of most people) are not good things to do. 
This pa:rticular condition does not lend itself to questioning as 
a way to perform indirect warnings; the sorts of questions one would 
expect to be indirect warnings are: 
(142) Is it wise to feed cockroaches? 
(143) Should you grow pot in your front yard? 
(144) Would it be healthful to eat granola? 
These are obviously not warnings; they a:re not even suggestions; they 
may have the perlocutionary effect of warning, but not even that is 
obvious. There are two possible reasons for these questions not being 
indirect warnings. One has to do with the syntactic form of the 
question, which must be that the auxiliary is positive (s i nce the 
action is a negative or undesirable one); it seems that although the 
negative auxiliary implies the desirability of the complement (as was 
noted above), the positive auxiliary does not quite impl y the negative; 
it seems, rather, to be relatively neutral in this respect . Therefore 
the undesirability is not implied and the warning is not produced. 
The other possible reason that (142)-(144) a:re not indirect warnings 
is that warnings are toward the strong end of the impositive squish . 
Consequently, unless a speaker is fairly secure in bis belief that the 
action is undesirable he will not feel Justif ied in making a warning; 
if the hearer is already involved in the action or obviousl y contemplating 
it, a speaker who is not secure in bis belief of the undesirability of 
the action will become even more insecure, since the very fact that the 
hearer does not seem to consider it undesirable may influence his (i.e., 
the speaker's) views on the matter. 
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It is the combination of the Good For condition and the Reason 
condition that produces the most common form of warnings, the condi-
tional sentence. In some cases the Good For condition is relatively 
explicit, e .g.: 
(J.45) Don't touch that, if you know what's good for you. 
(146} If you want to stay alive, tell us the secret formula . 
In other cases, it is not quite so explicit, e.g.: 
(147) 
(148) 
There's a good reason not to sell now. 
You'll lose a bundle if you sell now. 
(149) If you as much as look cross- eyed, I'll punch you 
in the nose. 
(150) Don't move or I'll blast you. 
(151) Don't touch it or it'll sting you. 
Sentence (147) is not the best warning a person could give, but that is 
due to the fact that if the speaker has a reason, it is more normal for 
him to say what that reason is rather than to siJ!lply state that there 
is one. However, if the hearer has sufficient confidence in the speaker's 
knowledge of, for example the stoclunarket in (147), then such an 
assertion will probably serve as a warning. (148) is actually the 
more normal form that one would expect an indirect warning to take, i.e . , 
the asserting of the reason for not doing the action. (149) is one of 
the most common ways that varnings are made, giving the reason fot not 
doing an action in terms of a hypothetical situation; it is, of course 
an exaggerated warning, but such an exaggeration simply adds force to 
the intended effect. The warning in (150) is also a colll!llon type and, 
like (149), gives the reason for the hearer's not doing the specified 
action. The last example is similar to the previous one and simply 
shows that warnings of this type do not have to be threats like (149) 
and (150) . 
As in the set of warnings derived from the Good For condition, 
there are no warnings based on the Reason condition in the form of a 
question. However·, there are sentences like (152}, 
(152) Why sell dope? 
which are not quite strong enough to be warnings, but which admonish 
or discourage. This is to be expected since admonish is weaker on the 
impositive squish than~. and, in general, questioning is the milder 
form of indirect illocution and tends to be used for weaker sorts of 
impositive acts. 
4 . 5. The Reason condition is asserted and questioned to perform 
suggestions in the following sentences: 
(153) There's no reason not to have a party. 
(J.54) There 's nothing preventing us from making stroganoff. 
(155) I see no reason not to drink wine. 
(156) Is there any reason not to invite Yuriko? 
(157) Does anyone have anything against rehearsing now? 
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The first two of these indirect suggestions are plain enough . (155) 
uses only the additional assumption that a reason has to be knovn to 
be a reason. The question (156) is straightforward and (157) requires 
only that a possible reason for not rehearsing now is understood to be 
that someone may not want or be able to. There is a point that becomes 
slightly more prominent here than in previous examples, and that is 
that all these sentences are ambiguous; they all have literal interpre-
tations where the speaker intends only to state a fact or request 
information . In cases such as (156) and (157) where the literal 
readings tend to overshadow the indirect illocutionary readings, the 
stress of the sentences plays an important part . To be a suggestions, 
(156) must be stressed normally, i.e . , on Yuriko; if the stress is on 
!!.2!., for instance, the suggestion reading does not come through . 
Likewise, for (157); the stress must be on now, which is the essence of 
the suggestion; extra stress anywhere else obliterates the impositive 
reading. 
Recommendations based on the Reason condition are: 
(158} There's at least one good reason to impeach the 
president. 
(159} We'll make a lot of money if we sell now. 
(160} You'll live longer if you practice yoga. 
(161) Why don't we go horseback riding?
(162) Why not buy the Bishop Estate? 
The only assumptions involved in these sentences is that at least one 
reason is a reason, sentence (158); making a lot of money is a good 
reason for doing something, (159); and living longer is a reason to do 
something, (160) . Like the guggestions in (156) and (157). the stress 
in the indirect recommendations (161) and (162) affects the import of 
the recommendation. The normal stress of (161) is on horseoa.ck; 
however if it is shifted to don't the recommending force is lost and 
the only sense left is that of requesting information. The stress can 
be shifted to ve and still maintain the impositive reading; the only 
difference is that the recommendation centers on us as opposed to some 
other person or people. When the stress is reduced on don't and we 
they can be deleted, and a sentence of the form illustrated by (162) 
results. (162) can have stress either on~ or Bishop Estate and 
still be an indirect recommendation, but if there is extra stress on 
why or not it must oe interpreted literally. 
4.6. There are rather common types of suggestions which seem to be 
indirect but are not derivable, in any straightforward way , from the 
intrinsic conditions on direct suggestions. The first of these is 
the Let's suggestions, such as: 
(163) Let's go to town. 
(164} Let's think about moving to California. 
(165) Let's have dinner. 
Part of the problem with these suggestions is that they are, at least 
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to some degree, idiomatic with very curious syntactic properties.34 
None of the intrinsic conditions discussed above provide a basis 
for the Let's suggestions ; however, there may be some basis for these 
suggestions in the intermediate (i.e., neither purely intrinsic nor 
purely extrinsic} Status condition. Since the form of Let's suggestions 
is idiomatic, it is very difficult to see what the exact relationship 
between them and the Status condition is. It does seem, however, that 
the speaker and bearer have equal status in Let's constructions, and 
if the Let's idiom originated .from the permission granting let, and if 
the underlying subject of Let's is both ;i;_and you (as Costa 1972 suggests), 
these facts vould link up the equal status requirement and the Let's 
suggestions. This is all very tenuous, of course, but there is one 
other fact that may lend it support . Sentences like (166) and (167), 
(166) Let's go, Sheila. 
(167) Let's get crackin' , Kay. 
can, for some speakers, be interpreted as not including tbe speaker in 
the action. When this is the case, the force of such impositives is 
much stronger than just a suggestion. It is, in fact, very like an 
order, made 13as severe (or perhaps even indirect) by using the equal status Let 's. ' 
Another type of imposit ive act which does not fit neatly into the 
framework provided here are those beginning with How about and~ 
a.bout as in: 
(168) How about a drjnk? 
(169) How about coming home with me? 
(170) What about Arlene? 
(171) What about goir,g home? 
These too are idiomatic; there is no direct, literal reading of them. 
Because of this idiomaticity I can only offer a suggestion as to how they 
might be related to the felicity conditions on impositive acts: that 
How about and What about forms originate from questions on the order of 
How do you feel about and What do you think about, whose most direct 
function is to elicit an opinion from the hearer. Speakers generally 
only elicit opinions from people they consider their equals or 
superiors. According to the Status condition, these How about and 
What about sentences, if they are to be interpreted as impositive acts, 
must be either suggestions or requests. And so they are: (168)- (171) 
are all interpreted as suggestions by some speakers, while others take 
(168) and (169) to be suggestions and (170) and (171) to be requests. 
(168) a. How about a drink? 
b. That's a good idea. 
( J.69) 
c . 
a . 
OK. /''Sorry. 
How about coming ho.me with me. 
b. That's a lousy idea. 
c. OK. /?Sorry. 
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(170) a. What about Arlene? 
b . That 's a possibility. 
c . OK./Sorry. 
(171) a . What about going home? 
b. I 'll keep that in mind. 
c . OK./Sorry. 
4.7 . I conclude with a brief discussion of verbs which exhibit some 
properties of i mpogitive verbs, but which differ from them in 
fundamental ways.3° The first of these 'semi-impositives' is the verb 
invite ; invitations look very much like regular impositive acts. They 
can be direct: 
(172) a . I hereby invite you to my party. 
b. You are hereby invited to my party . 
They can also have the same indirect forms that requests can have, e . g., 
(173) Can you come to my party? 
(17li) Will you come to my party? 
(175) I'd like you to come to my party. 
or even some of the suggestion forms, 
(176) How about coming to my party? 
(177) Why don't you come to my party? 
(178) Why not come to my party? 
The request- type invitations of (173)-(175) are more normal than the 
suggestion- types (176)-(178) and (176) is a better invitation than 
(177), which in turn is slightly better than (178). Why there should 
be a difference among the invitations (176)-(178) is not clear, but 
the difference between (173)-(175) and (176)-(178) is understandable. 
Requests are more polite than suggestions; invitations generally are 
polite and therefore the requesting forms are better invitations than 
the suggesting forms. There is a problem here however, being polite 
means assuming a position inferior to that of the hearer, but at the 
same time, a speaker must, in order to be able to issue an invitation, 
be in a position higher than that of the hearer. In this way invitations 
are different from impositives; although it may be the case for 
impositive acts that the speaker is only acting as an inferior, there 
are no impositive acts which require that the speaker have higher status 
and at the same time require the speaker to act as if he had lower status. 
The other major differences between invitations and impositive 
acts involves illocutionary point . The purpose or aim of invitations 
seems to be to get the hearer to do something, which is the same as 
the illocutionary point of impositives. There is, however, another way 
of l ooking at the purpose of invitations: what appears to be the 
illocutionary point is actually a purely perl ocutionary effect, and 
the illocutionary point of invitations is actually just to give the 
hearer permission to do something or to make an action possible for 
the hearer. Whether getting someone to do something is illocutionary 
or purely perlocutionary is in principle easily determined. If 
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invitations are impositive acts, it is safe to assume they are requests; 
it was proposed in P. Lee (1974} that the positive responses, 
(179) OK. 
(180) Sure. 
(181) All right . 
and the negative response , 
(182) Sorry. 
were appropriate to illocutionary requests but not to perlocutionary 
requests , for which they require elaborated responses . E. g . , 
(183) OK, I'll come, 
(184) Sure, I'd like to come . 
(185) All right, I'll be there. 
(186) Sorry, I can't make it. 
The problem with invitations is that, at least in my dialect, i t 
is not obvious that the simple responses (179)-(182) are completely 
inappropriate, although they do seem considerably worse than the 
elaborated responses (183)-(186): 
(187) A. i. Cao you come to my party? 
ii . I ' d like you to come to my party , 
(188) B. i. 
ii. 
?*OK. 
?Sure. 
iii. ?*AJ.l r ight . 
iv. ?Sorry . 
(189) B. i. OK, I'll come, 
ii. Sure, I'd like to come . 
iii. All right, I 'll be there . 
iv. Sorry, I can ' t make it . 
I have called i nvitations semi- impositives because their status 
condition works differently than that of any impositive act and their 
illocutionary point, though similar, is not indisputably t he same as 
that of impositive acts. There are semi-impositive acts which appear 
to be special types of invitations and differ from impositives in 
even mot·e interesting ways. 
These acts I will refer to as challenges ; they are performed 
and/or described by the verbs dare , ~ and challenge and are 
exemplified in: 
(190) I dare you to cross that line . 
(191) I defy you to say that again. 
(192) I hereby challenge you to {defend that claim,) 
a dual at sunrise . 
Challenges are invitations in that they invite (or make it possible 
for} the hearer to do some action. Rowever, challenges differ from 
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norroaJ. invitations in the application of felicity conditions . The 
status condition is the same as for invitations (that is, the speaker 
has higher status than the hearer) but one of the ultimate results 
the speaker of a challenge hopes to produce is to conclusively determine 
his superior status . 
Another felicity condition that holds for impositives does not 
hold for challenges, namely, the Good For condition. A speaker uttering 
a challenge does not believe that the hearer's taking up the challenge 
will benefit him (the hearer); in fact, he believes quite t he opposite 
and is trying to get the hearer to engage in an activity that will be 
harmf'ul to him. 
The Possibility condition is an interesting one for challenges. 
It seems to hold for them as (193) sho.,,s : 
(193) tree, 
However, a common form of indirect challenges is based on the negation 
or denial of this condition, e.g., 
(194) You can't climb that tree . 
(195) You can't catch me . 
Notice that the hearer may respond to (194) or (195) "1th either of the 
following tvo remarks: 
(196) Is that a challenge? 
(197) That sounds like a dare to me . 
This is the first instance we have seen of the denial of a felicity 
condition being used to perform an indirect illocutionary act. A closer 
look at negative illocutionary verbs is needed to see ho" general this 
phenomenon is . 
The denial of the possibility condition as an indirect challenge 
is also exhibited in certain uses of the verbs bet and wager . When 
these verbs are used to express the speaker's belief that the hearer 
is incapable of performing a particular action, the resulting asser-
tions are illocutionary challenges . E .g., 
(198} I bet you can't catch me . 
(199) I wager you aren't able to do it. 
This illustrates another new aspect of indirect illocutionary acts: 
the existence of specific verbs that can be used to perform only 
indirect illocutions . Bet and wager do not count as challenges 
(although they are, of course, used as direct bets), as the unaccep-
tability of (200) and (201) show, 
(200) nr bet you to climb that tree . 
(201) *I wager that you eaten me . 
(The asterisks here refer only to the challenge reading; with that-
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clauses both verbs are acceptable but must be interpreted as bets, in 
which case the speaker does believe that hearer can do the specified 
action . ) 
llegative bets without the modal of possibility can are a.mbiguous 
as between bets and challenges, though the literal (bet) reading is 
stronger: 
(202) I bet you don't climb that tree. 
(203) I wager that you don ' t catch me. 
This discussion has only touched upon the possibilities involved 
in related illocutionary act types (impositives and invitations), denial 
of felicity conditions, and indirect illocutionary verbs . P. more 
comprehensive analysis must await further investigation. 
There is one last semi- impositive I would like to mention . The 
verb threaten describes both linguistic and non-linguistic acts; it is 
related to the impositive ~ in that a threat can be a specific kind 
of warning- -namely, one in which the speaker intends to produce the 
undesirable effect being warned against. 
However, threats can be used to inform the hearer of the speaker ' s 
intention to harm him. Threats only seem impositive when the hearer is 
offered a choice: either do the specifid action or suffer the consequences. 
The following threats do not have impositive force. 
(204) I'm going to take your teddy bear away . 
(205) No matter what you do, you can't stop me; I'm going 
to cut your hair. 
Illocutionarily, threats are connnissives; causing people to do 
things is a perlocutionary effect of threats which can be either inten-
tional or unintentional. Tr In this regard threats are very much like 
contingent promises which also have the perlocutionary effect of getting 
the hearer to do something. Thus the difference between the two is 
neither illocutionary or perlocutionary . The sentences below are threats 
if the intention of the speaker is to do something which is not good for 
the hearer, and they are promises if it is something that is good for 
the hearer. 
(206) Cook dinner, and I'll help you with your project . 
(207) If you cook dinner, I'll help you with your project. 
The two int~rpretations of (206) and (207} depend entirely on the Good For 
condition;3u the relationship between threats and promises is similar 
to many different types of impositive acts which have the same illocu-
tionary point but different felicity conditions . 
The discussion presented here of semi-impositives is meant oP.ly 
as an indication that there are related speech act types and that such 
relations can be described in terms of illocutionary point, perlocutionary 
effect, and felicity conditions. Further such analyses of other types 
of speech acts should provide us with much valuable information on the 
nature of illocutionary acts . 
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Footnotes 
*This is a revision of Chapters III-VI of uzy- OSU Ph.D. dissertation 
(Maren 1974 ) . 
1In Hov to Do Things with Words, J. L. Austin offers the first 
recent taxonomy of speech acts, bis classification includes verdictives, 
exercitives, commissives, behabitives and expositives. 
2zeno Vendler in Res Cogitans redefines Austin's classes and 
adds two more, operatives and interrogatives . 
3At least they are not direct attempts to get people to do things; 
they may function as indirect illocutionary illocutionary impositive 
acts, but tnat is a different matter (see Lee 1974 b: Ch. 5) . 
4R. Lakoff (1972} has suggested that a pragmatic analysis is 
possible and that certain pragmatic features have syntactic consequences. 
However, it is not clear that these features a.re purely pragmatic, i.e., 
are not semantic features with closely related pragmatic features. 
5By illocutionary point Searle means, at least roughly, the 
purpose, intention or aim of the act. In the same 1973 paper Searle 
provides a taxonomy- of speech acts consisting of reprpsentatives, 
directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations. Impositives 
are Searle's directives. 
6.rbe term 'semantic structure' is used throughout this paper 
rather preswnptuously; there are no doubt deeper semantic representations 
for tne structures presented here. 
7R. Lakoff (1968) in discussing abstract performative verbs in 
Latin syntax uses Il'1PER for commands only and suggests that there are 
other such verbs for other types or impositive acts . Sadock (1971a} 
us~s IMPERE in an underlying structure (p . 223), but gives no explanation 
of what he means by it. 
8The verbs suggest, recommend, and advise are, for some speakers, 
ambiguous as between a suggestion and a reconunendation; see section 2 . 5 
for more on this. 
91'his proposal, in general, is the same as R. Lakoff's (1968) vho 
advocated several different abstract performative verbs, each repre-
senting only surface verbs which are synonymous . Each of her abstract 
performative structures are differentiated by undergoing only certain 
transformational rules. 
lOPerformative Deletion vas proposed by Ross (1970a, 1970b) and, 
although there are some problems with its exact formulation and appli-
catior, (see Anderson (1971) and Fraser (1971) for criticism of the 
performative analysis), the general idea is sound. All types of 
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impositive acts can be formed via this rul.e: it applies after Equi-lW 
Deletion for orders (accounting for the imperative sentence type in 
Go home!) and before Subject-Verb Inversion for requests (Will you go 
home?). 
11Several linguists have discussed this particul.ar sort of 
ambiguity; G. Lee (1971) argues that the connection-of-ideas sense 
derives from a structure involving CAUSE (SEEM) whereas the agentive 
sense derives from an underlying agent. Zwtc-ky· and· Zvicky (1973) 
suggest that the ambiguity stems from an underlying REASON which divides 
into CAUSE (for non-agentives) and PURPOSE (for agentives). 
12The term 'pro- agentive' was introduced by G. Lee (1971) and 
refers to contexts in which agents may occur; the opposite term 'anti-
agentive' describes contexts in which agents may not occur. Lee 
distinguishes pro- agentive contexts from the broader class of non-stative 
verbs proposed by G. Lakof:f (1966); the following are pro-agentive 
contexts; in imperative sentence form; with a manner adverb typically 
referring to human attributes (e.g., cleverly, £Upidly, intentionally); 
and as complement of the verb Persuade. In contrast, a test such as 
whether or not a verb can occur in the progressive says nothing about 
agentivity, but only whether that verb is stative or non-stative. 
13Notice that the relationship between the two verbs is such that 
suggest3 implies suggest2 , but not vice versa; a sentence such as (i) 
is contradictory for all speakers: 
(i) She suggested3 that Harbird was guilty (by saying 
"I suggest Harbird did it.") without actually 
suggestin~ it. 
It is because suggest3 implies suggest2 that G. Lakoff's (1970) test 
for showing ambiguity does not work: 
(ii) She suggested that Harbird was guilty and so did he. 
This line of argument was originally presented in Zwicky and Sadock 
(1975). 
14It may also be that the same speaker would accept (31)-(34) but 
not (38) simply because of the phonological idenitty of the two ~ests 
in (38). 
15See Morgan (1973) for an extremely interesting account of sentence 
fragments. 
16see G. Lee (1971) and Dowty (1972) for a discussion of the role 
DO plays in the semantic configurations of activities and agentive 
predicates. 
17There are speakers for whom (60) has a non-factive reading (in 
addition to the factive one); for those speakers sentence (60) is 
acceptable and means the same as (62). 
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18rt is possible that (61) is an indirect suggestion based on a 
felicity condition involving the notion of considering; this and other 
problems "1th the CONSIDER analysis "ill be discussed in section 2.6. 
l9This was suggested or reconunended to me by Gregory Lee. 
2Dflecommendations and suggestions are beginning to look very 
indiscrete , especie.iJ.y "ith respect to the Good For condition. 
21More will be said about this kind of illocution in the next 
section. 
22The almost argument is attributed to Jerry Morgan by McCa1'ley· 
(1968); the again argument is simply a logical extension of the almost 
argument . 
23.rbis argument is due to G. Lakoff (1970b). 
24An important non- essential condition of some impositive acts is 
that the speaker believe that the proposed action is one 1'hich is 
desirable to , or good for, the hearer or some concerned party . This 
is related to the essential condition of speaker desire in that it may 
provide a reason for the speaker's desiring to perform the act. 
25see Reringer (1972), Chapter three, for more general conditions 
on a wider variety of speech acts, which account for some indirect 
impositive acts such as, May I suggest you get ready and I would like 
to suggest that "e leave now. 
26nie status condition cannot be said to be strictly intrinsic or 
strictly extrinsic because it depends on the speaker and bearer sharing 
the belief that a particular status relation obtains. 
27Tbe term 'squish' is due to Ross (1972), who defines it as a 
quasi-continuum of linguistic elements . A later definition (Ross 1973: 
98) is: ' the matrix formed when two hierarchies interact to mutually 
define each other'. 
28Note that whether the notion of considering is represented as 
a semantic CONSIDER or as a felicity condition, it still falls under 
the domain of this condition, since in either case it is an act 
involved in the performance of an impositive act . 
29rt •.tas pointed out to me by Richard Garner that this appears 
to violate the illocutionary point of impositive acts . Rowever, that 
is only true if what the speaker is attempting to get the hearer to 
do is to complete the specified action. For these cases , it appears 
that the speaker is only trying to get the hearer to attempt to do 
the specified action. In this regard these acts are similar to the 
semi-impositive acts of challenging discussed in Lee (1974b: section 
6 . 7. ) 
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30A broader view of this condition is expressed in Searle's 
property six, which says that an act may differ in whether the 
proposition is in the interest of the speaker, hearer, both or 
neither . For impositive acts only the interest of the hearer is 
important . 
31Apparently, for some speakers there is an acceptable sarcastic 
reading of (108). It was suggested to me by Gregory Lee that such a 
reading is possible, especially if the adverb naturally is inserted 
before reconnnend. 
32There is also the factor of the extra-linguistic environment 
in which the act is performed affecting style; nominations and motions 
are the for mal equivalent of suggestions. 
33one way of looking at this difference is that for the weaker 
impositives the speaker is rel atively neutral toward the possibility 
of the action, but for orders the speaker believes strongly that the 
action is either possible or not (cf. note 29), 
3~Newmeyer (1971) points out that if Let's suggestions are assumed 
to have the underlying structure: CWe let we Cwe eatJJ certain tags 
are easily accounted for: 
(i) Let's eat, shall we? 
(ii) Let's eat, why don't we? 
However, he notes , such an underlying structure would predict (iii) 
i nstead of (iv) . 
(iii) "Let ourselves eat! 
(iv) Let us eat ! 
Costa (1972) proposes that Let ' s suggestions are 'true impera-
tives ' ~ith an underlying structure like: 
v~-------NP NP NP 
I I I I 
IIBGE I YOU / f1f='=/1"°"---
V NP NP and HP 
I I I I 
let you you I 
V NP 
I ~ 
go NP and NP 
I I 
you I 
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35It was pointed out to me by Arnold Zwicky that some speakers
have the compound suggestions: 
(i) { How about} 1 t ' d that'Don' t e s o . 
3~is disi:-ussion of kinds of invitations owes mui:-h to suggestions
from Gregory Lee . 
37This view is opposed to the one that Sadoi:-k (1974) takes; he 
claims that threats and warnings constitute a distinct Ulocuti onary
tY])e . 
38R. Lakoff {1969) discusses a consequence of this difference in 
application of the Good For condit i on . Where contingent promises 
normally have~. threats have any, e . g., 
some 
(i) If you eat {*any} candY, I ' ll give you ten dollars . .. 
(ii) If you eat ( !~~e} candy, I ' l l whip you . 
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